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EXHIBIT I

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
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             IN AND FOR THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO
               BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID A. GARCIA, JUDGE
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                         LAW & MOTION DEPARTMENT
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      WILLIAM R. SETZLER,
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                PLAINTIFF,
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          VS.
                                       NO.
                                             979587
      RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE CITY)
  9
      AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO,)
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                DEFENDANTS.
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                   REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
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                       THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1998
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     REPORTED BY: JOSEPH HAYDEN VICKSTEIN, CSR #4780
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THURSDAY, OCTOBER 22, 1998
                                                Morning Session
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                THE CLERK: Line 20, Setzler versus Retirement
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     Board.
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               MR. BENJAMIN: Good morning, Your Honor.
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                                                         David
     Benjamin for the Retirement Board.
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               MR. HEBEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Mike Hebel
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     on behalf of the Moving Party, Petitioner William Setzler.
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               THE COURT: Well, you know, a judge can be
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     prejudiced by inappropriate comments by a lawyer? Can't
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     happen. We are computers. Put the information in, kick out
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     the responses. Can't make appeals to our emotion. We don't
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     have emotions. Certainly you can't make an argument that is
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     inappropriate and have that sway the Court.
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               MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, I realize what you are
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     talking about. But the main gist of this motion --
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               THE COURT: Other than that, where is the new
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     evidence and the new law?
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               MR. HEBEL: Under this motion, Your Honor, I am
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     really asking you to reweigh the evidence because ---
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               THE COURT: I understand that. You are saying the
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     trial court -- which is the other premise of this. We don't
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     have new evidence. We don't have new law.
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               MR. HEBEL: We have new evidence, Your Honor.
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     have the declarations by the Petitioner. We have the
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     declarations by the Counsel to the Sheriff who I have asked
     to be here and who is sitting in the courtroom,
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Mr. Harrigan.
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THE COURT: But what do those establish for me?

MR. HEBEL: What they establish is that --

THE COURT: Because I am still dealing with a record, aren't I. This is not a trial de novo where I take new evidence. So we have a fixed record. It's the administrative hearing, is it not?

MR. HEBEL: It is.

THE COURT: Okay. So you are asking me to look at that record and determine whether or not -- and remind me, what is the standard of review here?

MR. HEBEL: Independent judgment.

THE COURT: Independent judgment. So I weigh the evidence. That's what I thought I was doing. And determine whether or not the evidence supports the decision made by the hearing officer. But the problem is, is you are asking me on new trial. See, so I think it's no longer an independent evidence test. The independent evidence test would be if I were the original judge ruling on the Writ of Mandate, right?

Unfortunately, you are now asking me -- and I know it's an unfortunate circumstance because I wasn't that judge.

MR. HEBEL: That's right.

THE COURT: For me to reconsider that, in effect, that judge's decision. Judge no longer being available. I guess I am per force the judge that has to make a decision in this case. You are asking me now to say that that judge

clearly erred as a matter of law, aren't you?

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MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, I believe I am asking you for today to be Judge Williamson. Even though you can't, but to stand in his shoes.

THE COURT: I understand. You are asking me. But I guess my question to you is this: On a Motion for New Trial, is the standard that I have now to reweigh the evidence for the second time? Assumptively I have weighed the evidence once and come up with the answer, "Petition for Writ of Mandate denied," right?

MR. HEBEL: Yes.

THE COURT: And now the question is, having done that, you are asking me to look at my prior decision and assess whether or not that decision is wrong as a matter of law, right?

And I guess I am struggling with, does that mean that on a Motion for New Trial following the denial of Writ of Mandate that the test is exactly the same as it was before?

MR. HEBEL: I believe on this motion, we are requesting and you are required to reweigh the evidence that supports --

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HEBEL: -- supports or does not support the findings.

THE COURT: Okay. And it's important to understand, because this is where the case is won or lost, I think, on the test. Do you agree that that's the test,

Counsel?

MR. BENJAMIN: I agree that the test is independent judgment when the Writ of Mandate was tried before Judge Williamson, and I believe that now the Petitioner is coming forward and asking in essence the trial judge to change his mind and arguing that the evidence doesn't justify what the trial court did.

THE COURT: But what is the test? What is the test? The substantial evidence test? All right. You haven't really addressed that in your Points and Authorities in opposition, have you?

MR. BENJAMIN: You are right. We did address the evidence that supports it.

THE COURT: So you in essence conceded for purposes of this discussion that it's a weight of the evidence test?

MR. BENJAMIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor?

THE COURT: I think you conceded that it was a weight of the evidence test, not having addressed the issue.

I merely raise it on my own, because I am not sure that it is. But that's my struggle. Go ahead.

MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, I realize you are at somewhat of a disadvantage in that this is a massive file attached to it which Judge Williamson saw.

What we are really asking you to take another look at it, this is a Deputy Sheriff who has now been off work without a disability retirement and without reinstatement to employment, exactly today, for 3,215 days. He had an

admitted injury on January 2nd, 1990.

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. HEBEL: He's received all benefits legally obligated to give him by law. He ran out of everything in May of 1996.

We have set forth -- the most disturbing part of the judgment, has to do with the indication that first of all, he's not credible. And secondly, that he did not make good faith efforts to return to work.

THE COURT: I understand that. That those judgments were made by the hearing officer. And of course that is -- once we start talking about credibility, I think we start running into some difficulty with the standard. Because credibility, even on a Writ of Mandate, is something that the courts generally look very closely at the record and will accord some significant respect to the party that is the judicial officer, if you will, and quasi-judicial officer that heard the evidence, won't we? They see the demeanor of the witness.

MR. HEBEL: It's a question as to whether he made good faith efforts to return to work.

THE COURT: I understand.

MR. HEBEL: And we submitted significant numbers of declarations indicating that he has.

THE COURT: But you see, I don't think that I am entitled to consider that.

MR. HEBEL: All right. Let me ask you if you are entitled --

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Am I? Am I entitled to now expand THE COURT: 1 this record, in essence to reopen the trial? I mean it is a limited trial de novo. And I agree that there might be some circumstances under which it is that a court might open the case up. But isn't that extremely limited, and it's not one 5 of the circumstances that we have in this case? 6 MR. HEBEL: I believe you are entitled to take a 7 look at it. You are entitled to look at it. 8 THE COURT: I looked at it. But that doesn't mean that I put it into that computer that I was talking about before, when I spit out my answer. 11 MR. HEBEL: Let me ask you to put this into your computer, Your Honor. The Court relied upon two doctors. The Court? THE COURT: MR. HEBEL: The first, Judge Williamson. THE COURT: Yes, but the Court was not really 16 relying on the two doctors. The Court was looking at the record that was presented to it. And those two doctors were in that record and it made a determination. The Court said it relied upon those MR. HEBEL: two doctors to come up to a conclusion that Mr. Setzler, Deputy Setzler was neither neurologically nor orthopedically disabled from employment. THE COURT: Okay. MR. HEBEL: And this has been the enormous difficulty in the case. Mr. Setzler goes back to those

release. And the doctor refuses to see him or give it to

doctors, especially Doctor Clifford, to get a medical

him.

The Sheriff's Department says, and continues to say, "Without that medical release, we will not take you."

That's really the crux of the matter that brings about this lack of good faith effort, lack of subjective symptoms.

This Deputy Sheriff, Your Honor, has been evaluated by at least four orthopedics. At least three neurosurgeons and three psychiatrists. None of whom find that his complaints and subjective symptoms are not credible.

The hearing officer, ALJ Stuart Judson, did not find that. Actually, he found that Mr. Setzler wanted to return to work on a light duty. Judge Cahill, when it was before him, never said that this particular Deputy Sheriff was not credible.

These two findings, which are the basis, in my judgment, for the Court's ruling, simply do not have anything supporting them. And what they do is so far overweigh what is in opposition to them.

MR. BENJAMIN: This is a case with a long history. It is a factual case. The fundamental issue is whether the Petitioner is disabled from working. And that determination of disability turns in large part on his credibility.

Three triers of fact have looked at it.

Administrative Law Judge, Judge Judson; Judge Cahill; Judge Williamson. All of them have found that Petitioner is not disabled for the performance of his duties.

There is nothing new in the evidence that -- or in

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the papers that Petitioner has submitted in support of his
Motion for New Trial. He's made the same arguments before.
He made them to Judge Williamson. He made them to Judge
Cahill.
          The essence of the problem regarding Petitioner's
return to work is that Petitioner claims that the Court's
decision puts him in a Catch 22 situation. But the only
Catch 22 is the one that Petitioner has created for himself.
       He tells the Court that he can't return to work,
but at the same time since 1990 and continuing right up
until the present, he claims that he's disabled and that he
can't work.
        THE COURT: I understand that. That was
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consistent. I think what you meant to say is he can return to work and that he is also disabled.

MR. BENJAMIN: I must have misspoke. Those are inconsistent. And we have set forth in detail the evidence that supports the Court's judgment.

MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, I really can do no more than show you as he is. And that's what he's done. And were Mr. Harrigan to step up next to me, he could verify that. Mr. Setzler cannot show up as he has multiple times at the Sheriff's --

Is the Sheriff ready to take him back? THE COURT: MR. HEBEL: The Sheriff is not ready to take him back, Your Honor.

> THE COURT: Okay.

Why? Because they have a light duty MR. HEBEL:

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policy. And because the policy says that Mr. Setzler must
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     obtain a medical release in order to report back to work.
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                THE COURT: Why does he have to get it back --
                MR. HEBEL: Pardon me, Your Honor?
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                THE COURT: Why did he have to go back to -- Well,
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     what you basically said to me is the doctor that he needed
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     to get the medical release from refused to even see him.
               MR. HEBEL:
                           Your Honor, no doctor --
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               THE COURT: But that doctor also found that he
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     wasn't disabled. So I am not sure how that plays.
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               MR. HEBEL: I must have misspoke. No doctor has
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     given him a medical release.
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               THE COURT: I understood that. I understood that.
               MR. HEBEL: His treating doctors, also the
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     evaluating doctors.
                          Simply none have.
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               THE COURT:
                           All right.
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               MR. BENJAMIN: Your Honor, it's up to -- the
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     release argument is not Petitioner's claiming not claiming
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     he can go back to work. He is claiming that he's disabled
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     and can't work.
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               The argument that he won't be released to work is
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     a ploy to advance his disability pension claim.
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     disability pension claim that we are here on. He claims
     that he's disabled. His argument that he can't return to
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     work is inconsistent with the very litigation that he's
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     maintaining.
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               THE COURT: All right. I will take it under
     submission. Thank you, very much.
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MR. HARRIGAN: Your Honor, would you, would it be productive if the Sheriff's position would be advanced to the Court?

THE COURT: You can tell me what it is. I guess the record should be complete.

MR. HARRIGAN: James Harrigan, attorney for the Sheriff appearing.

Your Honor, I have seen most of the pleadings in this case. And I read Judge Williamson's decision. The only clarification I wish to state for the record is this: The Sheriff's policy is that an injured deputy sheriff may return to work and may be considered for a modified assignment for a short period of time, provided that upon presenting himself or herself for reemployment, they have a physician's letter or document that says that they can return to full duty within 90 days.

Mr. Setzler has appeared with and without counsel at the office of the Sheriff several times over the past few years. Without having the benefit of that letter, I have been advised that he cannot obtain that due to his injury. I have read the reports. There are no doctors reports that I have seen that say that he can fulfill the duties of a deputy sheriff.

In fact the last letter, the last evaluation by Doctor Coughlin, who was appointed by Judge Cahill, specifically to do a medical analysis, found that Mr. Setzler is disabled; cannot perform the functions and the duties of deputy sheriff.

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There's been some suggestion that he has refused to abide by the policies of the Department. And rather than get into a discussion about form over substance, I think it's clear from a medical perspective, as to everything I'have seen, this gentleman cannot perform the role of a Deputy Sheriff and therefore cannot be considered for reemployment. And that's -- I'd be happy to answer any other questions.

MR. BENJAMIN: I'd like to address that, Your Honor.

Judge, Petitioner has been relying on Doctor
Coughlin throughout this litigation. He comes into Judge
Cahill two years ago and he tells Judge Cahill, "The Sheriff
won't let me return to work."

And so Judge Cahill said, "Why don't you go talk to Doctor Coughlin. That's your treating doctor."

And then the Petitioner went to Doctor Coughlin and told Doctor Coughlin that he can't do the work. He comes into court and he tells the Court that the Sheriff won't return him to work and then he brings the sheriff a note from his doctor saying that he can't go back to work, based on what the Petitioner himself told the doctor.

MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, he is as he is. And -THE COURT: What you are saying is that he's not,
that he's maintained a consistent position that he can't
return to work?

MR. HEBEL: He has maintained --

THE COURT: But don't you see, what that says to

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me is, is that if it's determined that he is not disabled, if there's -- if the weight of the evidence supports that decision, then my response is a very simple response.

If the weight of the evidence supports the decision that he's not disabled, then categorically the weight of the evidence supports the decision that he's malingering. And that he has not done what was necessary to get himself reinstated to the job. Okay?

Because this is what this is about, isn't it?

He's either disabled or he's a malingerer. And as cold and as cruel that may sound, that's what it's about. And that's where my analysis is. And that's where it's going to rest.

It's on the simple question.

Because if he's not disabled, then he's not entitled to judgment here. If he is disabled, then I suppose the review should be granted on the grounds that he's disabled and he should be given his disability retirement. All right.

MR. HEBEL: There's clarity to what you said. The difficulty is that the doctors who say, the doctor says he's not disabled; won't give him the opportunity to go -- won't give him the slip to give to Mr. Harrigan, so he can go back whether he's disabled or not and do it.

THE COURT: But that's not my problem. That is not my problem. Okay? You know, I am not going to question that doctor at this point in time. If he's going to another doctor who says he can't go back to work, in essence because he's relying on the patient's subjective complaints about

symptoms, so be it.

MR. HEBEL: Your Honor, that other doctor, Doctor Coughlin, is the City-appointed treating doctor. It's not as though Mr. --

THE COURT: I don't know what it means to be a "City-appointed treating doctor."

MR. HEBEL: There are two kinds. The employee selects or the City selects.

THE COURT: But it doesn't make a difference to me, I think.

MR. HEBEL: It should in terms of --

THE COURT: A treating physician is a treating physician. I don't understand what you mean by -- I mean we are not talking about an Independent Medical Examiner.


MR. HEBEL: That, we do have one. We do have an Agreed Medical Examiner, who also found disability. Doctor Henry Eddington.

MR. HARRIGAN: If I may point out one final point.

Doctor Coughlin was provided a written description of the duties of the deputy sheriff, including all the physical requirements of the job.

I am not able to recall exactly how he phrased it in his letter, but my belief is that his assessment of Setzler's disability and ability to return to work was based in part, possibly largely in part, on his objective review of what the job requires, vis-a-vis the injury that's been documented. So to say that this was -- that he dashed off a letter only because the patient said "I can't go to work."

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I don't think that's true.
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               MR. BENJAMIN: Your Honor, may I please?
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     sorry.
                           I said, "submitted," I think almost
               THE COURT:
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     ten minutes ago. But that's all right. Go ahead.
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               MR. BENJAMIN: All of the doctors know what a
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     deputy sheriff does. They all evaluated the Petitioner. In
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     that respect, Doctor Coughlin is the doctor who said that
     what he has is a mystery and he doesn't know what it is.
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     And all he's doing --
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               THE COURT: The fact that he has a mystery doesn't
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     mean that he's not disabled.
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               MR. BENJAMIN: But he's accepting Petitioner's own
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     statement that he can't work.
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                           Nothing wrong with that. Sometimes
               THE COURT:
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     the only evidence of a person's ailment is the person's
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     complaint about his ailment. But ultimately we have to
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     assess that. All right. Thank you, very much.
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               MR. BENJAMIN:
                              Thank you.
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               MR. HEBEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Not by way of
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     argument, but there are five videos presently in the Court's
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     possession, and I would request that they stay in your
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     possession until the parties have agreed to a disposition.
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     That is that they not be destroyed, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: I destroy nothing, personally.
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               MR. HEBEL:
                          Thank you.
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                           I am a packrat.
               THE COURT:
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               MR. BENJAMIN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

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I, Joseph Hayden Vickstein, an official reporter of the Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the City and County of San Francisco, do hereby certify:

That the foregoing transcript, as reduced to transcript by computer under my direction and control to the best of my ability, is a full, true and correct computer transcription of the shorthand notes taken as such reporter of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Joseph Hayden Vickstein, CSR #4780